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Abstract. The famous Fiat-Shamir transformation turns any public-coin three-round interactive proof,
i.e., any so-called Σ-protocol, into a non-interactive proof in the random-oracle model. We study this
transformation in the setting of a quantum adversary that in particular may query the random oracle
in quantum superposition.
Our main result is a generic reduction that transforms any quantum dishonest prover attacking the
Fiat-Shamir transformation in the quantum random-oracle model into a similarly successful quantum
dishonest prover attacking the underlying Σ-protocol (in the standard model). Applied to the standard
soundness and proof-of-knowledge definitions, our reduction implies that both these security properties,
in both the computational and the statistical variant, are preserved under the Fiat-Shamir transforma-
tion even when allowing quantum attacks. Our result improves and completes the partial results that
have been known so far, but it also proves wrong certain claims made in the literature.
In the context of post-quantum secure signature schemes, our results imply that for any Σ-protocol
that is a proof-of-knowledge against quantum dishonest provers (and that satisfies some additional
natural properties), the corresponding Fiat-Shamir signature scheme is secure in the quantum random-
oracle model. For example, we can conclude that the non-optimized version of Fish, which is the bare
Fiat-Shamir variant of the NIST candidate Picnic, is secure in the quantum random-oracle model.
1 Introduction
The (quantum) random-oracle model. The random-oracle model (ROM) is a means to treat a cryp-
tographic hash function H as an ideal primitive. In the ROM, the only way to “compute” the hash H(x)
of any value x is by making a query to an imaginary entity, the random oracle (RO), which has chosen H
uniformly at random from the set of all functions with the considered domain and range.
The hope is that if a cryptographic scheme is secure in the ROM then it is also secure in the standard
model, as long asH is instantiated with a “good enough” cryptographic hash function. Even though in general
we cannot hope to obtain provable security in the standard model in this way, (since there exist artificial
counter examples [CGH04]), this approach works extremely well in practice, leading to very efficient schemes
that tend to resist all known attacks.
What makes the ROM particularly convenient is that in the security proof of a cryptographic scheme,
we can control the RO. For instance, simply by recording the queries that the adversary makes to the RO,
we know exactly which hash values he knows, and the hash value H(x) is random to him for any x that he
has not queried. Furthermore, we can reprogram the RO, meaning that we can let H(x) be some particular
value y for some specific x, as long as it is random from the adversary’s perspective.
When considering a quantum adversary, the picture changes a bit. In order to model that such an
adversary can evaluate any hash function in superposition on different inputs, we must allow such a quantum
adversary in the ROM to make superposition queries to the RO: for any superposition
∑
x αx|x〉 it may
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∑
x αx|x〉|H(x)〉 by making a single query to the RO. This is referred to as the quantum random-oracle
model (QROM) [BDF+11].
Unfortunately, these superposition queries obstruct the above mentioned advantages of the ROM. By
basic properties of quantum mechanics one cannot observe or locally copy such superposition queries made
by the adversary without disturbing them. Also, reprogramming is usually done for an x that is queried by
the adversary at a certain point, so also here we are stuck with the problem that we cannot look at the
queries without disturbing them.
As a consequence, security proofs in the ROM almost always do not carry over to the QROM. This
lack of proof does not mean that the schemes become insecure; on the contrary, unless there is some failure
because of some other reason5, we actually expect typical schemes to remain secure. However, it is often not
obvious how to find a security proof in the QROM. Some examples where security in the QROM has been
established are [Unr14, Zha15, ES15, Unr15, KLS18, ABB+17, Zha18, SXY18, BDK+18].
Main technical result. Our main technical result (Theorem 2) can be understood as a particular way
to overcome—to some extent— the above described limitation in the QROM of not being able to “read
out” any query to the RO and to then reprogram the corresponding hash value. Concretely, we achieve the
following.
We consider an arbitrary quantum algorithm A that makes queries to the RO and in the end outputs a
pair (x, z), where z is supposed to satisfy some relation with respect to H(x), e.g., z = H(x). We then show
how to extract early on, by measuring one of the queries that A makes, the very x that A will output, and
to reprogram the RO at the point x with a fresh random value Θ, with the effect that the pair (x, z) that A
then outputs now satisfies the given relation with respect to Θ, with a not too large loss in probability.
The way this works is surprisingly simple. We choose the query that we measure uniformly at random
among all the queries that Amakes (also counting A’s output), in order to (hopefully) obtain x. Subsequently
we reprogram the RO, so as to answer x with Θ, either from this point on or from the following query on,
where this binary choice is made at random. This last random decision seems counter-intuitive, but it makes
our proof work. Indeed, we prove that the probability that (x, z) satisfies the required relation drops by no
more than a factor O(q2), where q is the number of oracle queries A makes.
Application to the Fiat-Shamir transformation. The Fiat-Shamir transformation [FS87] turns any
public-coin three-round interactive proof, i.e., any so-called Σ-protocol, into a non-interactive proof in the
(Q)ROM. In the classical case it is well known that the security properties of the Σ-protocol are inherited by
the Fiat-Shamir transformation [BR93, FKMV12]. In the quantum setting, when considering the security of
the Fiat-Shamir transformation against quantum dishonest provers in the QROM, mainly negative results
are known—see below for a more detailed exposition of previous results and how they compare to ours.
It is quite easy to see that the above result on the reprogrammability of the RO is exactly what is needed
to turn a quantum prover that attacks the Fiat-Shamir transformation into a quantum prover that attacks
the underlying Σ protocol. Indeed, from any Fiat-Shamir dishonest prover A that tries to produce a proof
pi = (a, z) for a statement x, we obtain an interactive dishonest prover for the Σ protocol that extracts a
from A and sends it to the verifier, and then uses the received challenge c to reprogram the RO, so that
the z output by A will be a correct reply with respect to c with a probability not much smaller than the
probability that A succeeds in forging pi in the QROM.
This gives us a very generic transformation (stated in Theorem 8 below) from a Fiat-Shamir dishonest
prover to a Σ-protocol dishonest prover that is similarly successful, up to a loss in probability of order
O(q2). Applied to the standard notions of soundness and proof-of-knowledge, we prove that both these
security properties, in both the computational and the statistical variant, are preserved under the Fiat-
Shamir transformation in the QROM (Corollaries 13 and 16).
5 E.g., the underlying computational hardness assumption does not hold anymore in the context of a quantum
adversary.
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Comparison with prior results. Mainly negative results are known about the security of the Fiat-Shamir
transformation against quantum attacks. Figure 1 shows a table copied from [ARU14], which outlines the
different negative results on the security of Σ-protocols against quantum attackers that carry over to the Fiat-
Shamir transformation. All the potential positive claims on the security of the Fiat-Shamir transformation
were left unanswered (see Figure 1).
Properties of Σ-protocol Σ-protocol directly Fiat-Shamir transf.
special strict
soundness soundness PoK proof PoK proof
perf comp attack stat attack stat
comp comp attack attack attack attack
perf perf stat stat stat stat
Fig. 1: Table adapted from [ARU14], showing which versions of special soundness and strict soundness, which we
call unique responses, imply that the Σ-protocol is a proof of knowledge (PoK) or a proof (in the sense of ordinary
soundness). The values comp, stat and perf mean that the considered property holds respectively computationally,
statistically and perfectly, and attack means that there exist example schemes that allow an attack. Gray values are
copied from [ARU14]. The last column shows that the negative results carry over to the Fiat-Shamir transformation,
while our results (in bold face) complete the table by showing that also the positive results carry over. Previously, the
lower right corner entry was only known to be comp, and the other two entries were unknown. If the computational
version of the unique responses, or strict soundness, property is replaced by our quantum strengthening (Definition
24), all instances of attack can be replaced by comp.
Currently, the only known positive result on the security of the Fiat-Shamir transformation against
quantum attacks is the result by Unruh [Unr17], which shows that statistical soundness of the Σ-protocol
implies computational soundness of the Fiat-Shamir transformation. This means, the lower right stat in the
Fiat-Shamir column in Figure 1 was known to be ‘comp’.
Our generic transformation from a Fiat-Shamir dishonest prover to a Σ-protocol dishonest prover implies
that all the (considered) security properties of the Σ-protocol carry over unchanged to the Fiat-Shamir
transformation, i.e., without degradation from ‘stat’ to ‘comp’. Hence, we show that all the three open
settings from [ARU14] are statistically secure, as shown in Figure 1. 6
We point out that [DFG13] claims an impossibility result about the soundness of the Fiat-Shamir trans-
formation as a quantum proof of knowledge, which contradicts one of our implications above. However, their
result only applies to a restricted notion of proof of knowledge where the extractor is not allowed to measure
any of the adversary’s queries to the random oracle. The rational for this restriction was that such a mea-
surement would disturb the adversary’s quantum state beyond control; however, our technical result shows
that it actually is possible to measure one of the adversary’s queries and still have sufficient control over the
adversary’s behavior.
Relativizing prior negative results. At first glance, the negative results from [ARU14] together with
our new positive results, as shown in the Fiat-Shamir column in Figure 1, seem to give a complete answer
to the question of the security of the Fiat-Shamir transformation against quantum attacks. However, there
is actually more to it.
We consider a stronger but still meaningful notion of computational unique responses, which is in the spirit
of the collapsing property as introduced by Unruh [Unr16]. We call the new notion quantum computationally
unique responses and define it in Definition 24. Adapting a proof from [Unr12], it is not hard to see that a
Σ-protocol with (perfect or computational) special soundness and quantum computational unique responses
6 In the (quantum) random-oracle model, statistical security considers a computationally unbounded attacker with
a polynomially bounded number of oracle queries.
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is a computational proof of knowledge. Therefore, our result then implies that its Fiat-Shamir transformation
is a computational proof of knowledge as well.
Finally, our result also implies that if the Σ-protocol is computationally sound (as a ‘proof’), then its Fiat-
Shamir transformation is computationally sound as well. Interestingly, Unruh seems to suggest in [Unr17]
(right after Theorem 21) that this is not true in general, due to a counterexample from [ARU14]. The counter
example is, however, a Σ-protocol that is computationally special sound but not computationally sound (the
issue being that in the quantum setting, special soundness does not imply ordinary soundness).
Thus, with the right adjustments of the considered computational soundness properties, the three negative
answers in the Fiat-Shamir column in Figure 1 may actually be turned into positive answers. One caveat here
is that we expect proving quantum computationally unique responses to be much harder than computational
unique responses.
Application to signatures. Our positive results on the Fiat-Shamir transformation have direct appli-
cations to the security of Fiat-Shamir signatures. From the proof-of-knowledge property of the Fiat-Shamir
transformation we immediately obtain the security of the Fiat-Shamir signature scheme under a no-message
attack, assuming that the public key is a hard instance (Theorem 21). Furthermore, [Unr17] and [KLS18]
have shown that for Fiat-Shamir signatures, up to some loss in the security parameter and under some ad-
ditional mild assumptions on the underlying Σ-protocol, one can also derive security under chosen-message
attack.
In conclusion, Fiat-Shamir signatures offer security against quantum attacks (in the QROM) if the un-
derlying Σ-protocol is a proof of knowledge against quantum attacks and satisfies a few additional natural
assumptions (Theorem 22).
As a concrete application, using Unruh’s result on the collapsing property of the RO [Unr16] to argue
the collapsing version of computational unique responses (which we call quantum computational unique
responses) for the underlying Σ-protocol, we can conclude that the non-optimized version of Fish, which is
the Fiat-Shamir variant of Picnic, is secure in the QROM.
Comparison with concurrent results. In concurrent and independent work [LZ19]7, Liu and Zhandry
show results that are very similar to ours: they also show the security of the Fiat-Shamir transformation in
the QROM, and they introduce a similar stronger version of the computational unique responses property
in order to argue that a Σ-protocol is a (computational) proof of knowledge against a quantum adversary.
In short, [LZ19] differs from the work here in the following aspects. In [LZ19], the result on the Fiat-Shamir
transformation is obtained using a very different approach, resulting in a greater loss in the reduction:
O(q9) compared to the O(q2) loss that we obtain. On the other hand, on the quantum proof of knowledge
front, Liu and Zhandry introduce some additional techniques that, for instance, allow them to prove that
the Σ-protocol underlying Dilithium satisfies (their variant) of the newly introduced strong version of the
computational unique responses property, while we phrase this as a conjecture in order to conclude the
security of (some variant of) the Dilithium signature scheme.
2 Reprogramming the Quantum Random Oracle
We show and analyze a particular way to reprogram a random oracle in the quantum setting, where the
oracle can be queried in superposition.
2.1 Notation
We consider a quantum oracle algorithm A that makes q queries to an oracle, i.e., an unspecified function
H : X → Y with finite non-empty sets X ,Y. We may assume without loss of generality that A makes
7 The paper [LZ19] was put on eprint (ia.cr/2019/262) a few days after our eprint version (ia.cr/2019/190).
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no intermediary measurements. Formally, A is then described by a sequence of unitaries A1, . . . , Aq and
an initial state |φ0〉.
8 The unitaries Ai act on registers X,Y,Z,E, where X and Y have respective |X |- and
|Y|-dimensional state spaces, while Z and E is arbitrary. As will become clear, X and Y are the quantum
registers for the queries to H as well as for the final output x, Z is for the output z, and E is internal memory.
For any concrete choice of H : X → Y, we can write
AH |φ0〉 := AqO
H · · ·A1O
H |φ0〉 ,
for the execution ofA with the oracle instantiated byH , whereOH is the unitary OH : |x〉|y〉 7→ |x〉|y⊕H(x)〉
that acts on registers X and Y.
It will be convenient to introduce the following notation. For 0 ≤ i, j ≤ q we set
AHi→j := AjO
H · · ·Ai+1O
H
with the convention that AHi→j := 1 for j ≤ i. Furthermore, we set
|φHi 〉 :=
(
AH0→i
)
|φ0〉
to be the state ofA after the i-th step but right before the (i+1)-st query, and so that |φHq 〉 equals
(
AH0→q
)
|φ0〉
= AH |φ0〉, the output state produced by A.
Finally, for a given function H : X → Y and for fixed x ∈ X and Θ ∈ Y, we define the reprogrammed
function H ∗Θx : X → Y that coincides with H on X \ {x} but maps x to Θ. With this notation at hand,
we can then write (
AH∗Θxi→q
) (
AH0→i
)
|φ0〉 =
(
AH∗Θxi→q
)
|φHi 〉
for an execution of A where the oracle is reprogrammed at a given point x after the i-th query.
We are interested in the probability that after the execution of AH and upon measuring register X in the
computational basis to obtain x ∈ X , the state of register Z is of a certain form dependent on x and H(x).
This relation is captured by a projection GHx , where, more generally, for x, x
′ ∈ X and Θ ∈ Y we set
GΘx,x′ = |x
′〉〈x′| ⊗ 1⊗Πx,Θ ⊗ 1 ,
where {Πx,Θ}x∈X ,Θ∈Y is a family of projections acting on Z, which we refer to as a quantum predicate. We
use the short hands GΘx for G
Θ
x,x and G
H
x for G
H(x)
x , i.e.,
GHx = |x〉〈x| ⊗ 1⊗Πx,H(x) ⊗ 1 .
For an arbitrary but fixed x◦ ∈ X , we then consider the probability
‖GHx◦ |φ
H
q 〉‖
2
2 .
Understanding AH as an algorithm that outputs the measured x together with the state z in register Z, we
will denote this probability also by
Pr
[
x=x◦ ∧ V (x,H(x), z) : (x, z)← A
H
]
,
understanding V to be a quantum predicate specified by the projections Πx,H(x).
2.2 Main technical result
We consider a quantum oracle algorithm A as formalized above, and we define a two-stage algorithm S with
black-box access to A as follows. In the first stage, S tries to predict A’s future output x, and then, upon
8 Alternatively, we may understand |φ0〉 as an auxiliary input given to A.
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input a (random) Θ, in the second stage tries to output what A is supposed to output, but now with respect
to Θ instead of H(x).
S works by running A, but with the following modifications. First, one of the q + 1 queries of A (also
counting the final output in register X) is selected uniformly at random and this query is measured, and the
measurement outcome x is output by (the first stage of) S. Then, this very query of A is answered either
using the original H or using the reprogrammed oracle H ∗Θx, with the choice being made at random, while
all the remaining queries of A are answered using oracle H ∗Θx.9 Finally, (the second stage of) S outputs
whatever A outputs.
Here, the figure of merit is the probability that for a fixed x, both the intermediate measurement and a
measurement of the register X return x and that the register Z contains a state that satisfies the considered
quantum predicate with respect to x and its (now reprogrammed) hash value Θ. Formally, this probability
is captured by
E
Θ,i,b
[∥∥GΘx (AH∗Θxi+b→q) (AHi→i+b)X |φHi 〉∥∥22
]
where here and from now on, we use X as a short hand for the projection |x〉〈x| acting on X. The expectation
is taken over Θ ∈ Y, i ∈ {0, ..., q} and b ∈ {0, 1} uniformly random. Note that the random bit b ∈ {0, 1}
determines whether the measured query is answered with H or with H∗Θx.
We write SA[H ] to emphasize that S only makes black-box access to A and that it depends on H . Our
main technical lemma below then ensures that for any H and for a random Θ ∈ Y, the success probability
of SA[H ] is up to an order-q2 loss not much smaller than that of AH∗Θx, and therefore not much smaller
than that of AH in case of a random H .
Lemma 1 For any H : X → Y and x ∈ X , it holds that
E
Θ,i,b
[∥∥GΘx (AH∗Θxi+b→q)(AHi→i+b)X |φHi 〉∥∥22
]
≥
EΘ
[∥∥GΘx |φH∗Θxq 〉∥∥22
]
2(q + 1)(2q + 3)
−
∥∥X |φHq 〉∥∥22
2(q + 1)|Y|
.
where the expectation is over random Θ ∈ Y, i ∈ {0, . . . , q} and b ∈ {0, 1}.10
Proof. We assume that the Y-register of |φHq 〉 =
(
AH0→q
)
|φ0〉 is |0〉 no matter what H is; this is without loss
of generality since it can always be achieved by an insignificant modification to A, i.e., by swapping Y with a
default register within E. For the purpose of the proof, we introduce an additional step AHq→q+1 that simply
applies OH , and we expand the notions of |φHj 〉 and A
H
i→j to allow j = q+ 1. Finally, we “enhance” G
Θ
x to
11
G˜Θx := G
Θ
x (1⊗ |Θ〉〈Θ| ⊗ 1⊗ 1) = X ⊗ |Θ〉〈Θ| ⊗Πx,Θ ⊗ 1 .
For any 0 ≤ i ≤ q, inserting a resolution of the identity and exploiting that
(
AH∗Θxi+1→q+1
)(
AHi→i+1
)(
1−X
)
|φHi 〉 =
(
AH∗Θxi→q+1
)(
1−X
)
|φHi 〉 ,
we can write
(
AH∗Θxi+1→q+1
)
|φHi+1〉 =
(
AH∗Θxi+1→q+1
)(
AHi→i+1
)(
1−X
)
|φHi 〉 +
(
AH∗Θxi+1→q+1
)(
AHi→i+1
)
X |φHi 〉
=
(
AH∗Θxi→q+1
)(
1−X
)
|φHi 〉 +
(
AH∗Θxi+1→q+1
)(
AHi→i+1
)
X |φHi 〉
=
(
AH∗Θxi→q+1
)
|φHi 〉 −
(
AH∗Θxi→q+1
)
X |φHi 〉 +
(
AH∗Θxi+1→q+1
)(
AHi→i+1
)
X |φHi 〉
9 If it is the final output that is measured then there is nothing left to reprogram.
10 We consider |Y| to be superpolynomial in the security parameter, so that 1
2(q+1)|Y|
is negligible and can be neglected.
In cases where |Y| is polynomial, the presented bound is not optimal, but an improved bound can be derived with
the same kind of techniques.
11 Informally, these modifications mean that we let A make one more query to get H(x) into register Y, and G˜H(x)x
would then check that Y indeed contains H(x).
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Rearranging terms, applying G˜Θx and using the triangle equality, we can thus bound∥∥G˜Θx (AH∗Θxi→q+1)|φHi 〉∥∥2 ≤
∥∥G˜Θx (AH∗Θxi+1→q+1)|φHi+1〉∥∥2
+
∥∥G˜Θx (AH∗Θxi→q+1)X |φHi 〉∥∥2
+
∥∥G˜Θx (AH∗Θxi+1→q+1)(AHi→i+1)X |φHi 〉∥∥2 .
Summing up the respective sides of the inequality over i = 0, . . . , q, we get
∥∥G˜Θx |φH∗Θxq+1 〉∥∥2 ≤
∥∥G˜Θx |φHq+1〉∥∥2 +
∑
0≤i≤q
b∈{0,1}
∥∥G˜Θx (AH∗Θxi+b→q+1)(AHi→i+b)X |φHi 〉∥∥2 .
By squaring both sides, dividing by 2q + 3 (i.e., the number of terms on the right hand side), and using
Jensen’s inequality on the right hand side, we obtain
∥∥G˜Θx |φH∗Θxq+1 〉∥∥22
2q + 3
≤
∥∥G˜Θx |φHq+1〉∥∥22 +
∑
0≤i≤q
b∈{0,1}
∥∥G˜Θx (AH∗Θxi+b→q+1)(AHi→i+b)X |φHi 〉∥∥22
and thus
E
i,b
[∥∥G˜Θx (AH∗Θxi+b→q+1)(AHi→i+b)X |φHi 〉∥∥22
]
≥
∥∥G˜Θx |φH∗Θxq+1 〉∥∥22
2(q + 1)(2q + 3)
−
∥∥G˜Θx |φHq+1〉∥∥22
2(q + 1)
. (1)
Since both |Θ〉〈Θ| and AH∗Θxq→q+1 = O
H∗Θx commute with GΘx , we get
∥∥G˜Θx (AH∗Θxi+b→q+1)(AHi→i+b)X |φHi 〉∥∥22 ≤
∥∥GΘx (AH∗Θxi+b→q+1)(AHi→i+b)X |φHi 〉∥∥22
=
∥∥GΘx (AH∗Θxi+b→q)(AHi→i+b)X |φHi 〉∥∥22 . (2)
Also, because (X ⊗ |Θ〉〈Θ|)OH∗Θx = (X ⊗ 1)OH∗Θx, and OH∗Θx commutes with GΘx , we get
∥∥G˜Θx |φH∗Θxq+1 〉∥∥22 =
∥∥GΘx |φH∗Θxq 〉∥∥22 . (3)
Finally,
E
Θ
[∥∥G˜Θx |φHq+1〉∥∥22
]
≤ E
Θ
[∥∥(X ⊗ |Θ〉〈Θ|)OH |φHq 〉∥∥22
]
≤
1
|Y|
∥∥X |φHq 〉∥∥22 . (4)
Inserting (2), (3) and (4) into (1) yields the claimed result. ⊓⊔
2.3 Switching notation, and simulating the random oracle
Introducing more algorithmic-probabilistic notation, we write
(x, x′, z)← 〈SA[H ], Θ〉
to specify the probability space determined as follows, relying on the above construction of the two-stage
algorithm S when given A. In the first stage SA[H ] produces x, and then in the second stage, upon receiving
Θ, it produces x′ and z, where z may be quantum. Our figure of merit above, i.e., the left hand side of the
bound in Lemma 1 (with x replaced by x◦), is then denoted by
Pr
Θ
[
x=x◦ ∧ x
′=x◦ ∧ V (x,Θ, z) : (x, x
′, z)← 〈SA[H ], Θ〉
]
,
where the subscript Θ in PrΘ denotes that the probability is averaged over a random choice of Θ.
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Using this notation, but also weakening the bound slightly by not requiring x′ = x◦, for any H and x◦
the bound from Lemma 1 then becomes
Pr
Θ
[
x=x◦ ∧ V (x,Θ, z) : (x, z)← 〈S
A[H ], Θ〉
]
&
1
O(q2)
Pr
Θ
[
x=x◦ ∧ V (x,H(x), z) : (x, z)← A
H∗Θx
]
where the approximate inequality & hides the term 12(q+1)|Y| PrH
[
x= x◦ : (x, z) ← A
H
]
. Recall that the
output z may be a quantum state, in which case the predicate V is given by a measurement that depends
on x, and H(x) or Θ, respectively.
We fix a family H of 2(q + 1)-wise independent hash functions and average the above inequality over a
random choice of H ∈ H from this family. We simply write S for S[H ] with H chosen like that. Furthermore,
we observe that, for any fixed x, the family {H ∗ Θx |H ∈ H, Θ ∈ {0, 1}n} is a family of 2(q + 1)-wise
independent hash functions as well. Finally, we use that A (together with the check V (x,H(x), z)) cannot
distinguish a random function H∗Θx in that family from a fully random function H [Zha12]. This gives us
the following variation of Lemma 1, which we state as our main technical theorem:
Theorem 2 (Measure-and-reprogram) Let X ,Y be finite non-empty sets. There exists a black-box
polynomial-time two-stage quantum algorithm S with the following property. Let A be an arbitrary ora-
cle quantum algorithm that makes q queries to a uniformly random H : X → Y and that outputs some x ∈ X
and a (possibly quantum) output z. Then, the two-stage algorithm SA outputs some x ∈ X in the first stage
and, upon a random Θ ∈ Y as input to the second stage, a (possibly quantum) output z, so that for any
x◦ ∈ X and any predicate
12 V :
Pr
Θ
[
x=x◦ ∧ V (x,Θ, z) : (x, z)← 〈S
A, Θ〉
]
&
1
O(q2)
Pr
H
[
x=x◦ ∧ V (x,H(x), z) : (x, z)← A
H
]
,
where the & hides a term that is bounded by 12q|Y| when summed over all x◦.
Remark 3 We do not spell out in detail what it means for a quantum algorithm like S to be black-box; see
e.g. [Unr17] for a rigorous definition. What we obviously need here is that SA has access to A’s initial state
|φ0〉 and to q, and is given black-box access to the unitaries Ai. Furthermore, for later purposes, we need the
following composition property: if S is a black-box algorithm with access to A, and K is a black-box algorithm
with access to SA, then there exists a black-box algorithm KS with access to A so that (KS)A = K(S
A).
3 Security of the Fiat-Shamir Transformation
In this section, we show how to reduce security of the Fiat-Shamir transformation to the security of the
underlying Σ-protocol: any dishonest prover attacking the Fiat-Shamir transformation can be turned into
a dishonest prover that succeeds to break the underlying Σ-protocol with the same probability up to a
polynomial loss. This reduction is obtained by a straightforward application of Theorem 2. Our security
reduction holds very generically and is not strongly tight to the considered notion of security, as long as the
respective security definitions for the Σ-protocol and the Fiat-Shamir transformation “match up”.
3.1 Σ-protocols
We recall the definition of a Σ-protocol.
12 We recall that in case z is a quantum state, V is given by means of a measurement.
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Definition 4 (Σ-protocol) A Σ-protocol Σ = (P ,V) for a relation R ⊆ X ×W is a three-round two-party
interactive protocol of the form:
Prover P(x,w) Verifier V(x)
a
−→
c
←− c
$
← C
z
−→ Accept iff V (x, a, c, z) = 1
Using our terminology and notation from above, P is a two-stage algorithm and we can write
(a, z)← 〈P(x,w), c〉
for the generation of the first message a in the first stage and the reply z in the second stage once given the
challenge c.
Remark 5 We allow the set of instances X , the set of witnesses W and the relation R to depend on a
security parameter η. Similarly, the interactive algorithms P and V may depend on η (or have η as part of
their input). However, for ease of notation, we suppress these dependencies on η unless they are crucial.
Remark 6 We do not necessarily require a Σ-protocol to be perfectly or statistically correct. This allows
us to include protocols that use rejection sampling, where with a constant probability, the value z would
leak too much information on the witness w and so the prover sends ⊥ instead. On the other hand, by
default we consider the soundness/knowledge error to be negligible, i.e., a dishonest prover succeeds only
with negligible probability to make the verifier accept if x is not a valid instance or the prover has no witness
for it (depending on the considered soundness notion). Negligible soundness/knowledge error can always be
achieved by parallel repetition (see e.g. [Dam10]).
3.2 The Fiat-Shamir transformation
The Fiat-Shamir transformation turns a Σ-protocol Σ into a non-interactive proof system, denoted FS[Σ],
by replacing the verifier’s random choice of c ∈ C with c := H(x, a), where H : X ′ → C is a hash function
with a domain X ′ that contains all pairs x′ = (x, a) with x ∈ X and a produced by P . In other words, upon
input x and w, the honest FS-prover produces pi = (a, z) by running the two-stage Σ-protocol prover P but
using c = H(x, a) as challenge (i.e., as input to the second stage). In case Σ is not statistically correct, the
above process of producing pi = (a, z) is repeated sufficiently many times until V (x, a,H(x, a), z) is satisfied
(or some bound is reached). In either case, we will write this as
pi = (a, z)← PHFS(x,w) .
We may write as V HFS(x, pi) the FS-verifier’s check whether V (x, a,H(x, a), z) is satisfied or not. In the
security analysis, the hash function H is modeled by a random oracle, i.e. by oracle access to a uniformly
random H : X ′ → C.
When considering an adversary A that tries to forge a proof for some instance x ∈ X , one can distinguish
between an arbitrary but fixed x, and an x that is chosen by A and output along with a in case of Σ-protocols,
respectively along with pi in case of the Fiat-Shamir transformation. If x is fixed then the adversary is called
static, otherwise it is called adaptive. For the typical security definitions for Σ-protocols this distinction
between a static and an adaptive A makes no difference (see Lemmas 12 and 15 below), but for the Fiat-
Shamir transformation it (potentially) does.
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3.3 The generic security reduction
Since an adaptive adversary is clearly not less powerful than a static adversary, we restrict our attention
for the moment to the adaptive case. Recall that such an adaptive FS-adversary A outputs the instance
x ∈ X along with the proof pi = (a, z), and the figure of merit is the probability that x, a, z satisfies
V (x, a,H(x, a), z). Thus, we can simply apply Theorem 2, with (x, a) playing the role of what is referred to
as x in the theorem statement, to obtain the existence of an adaptive Σ-adversary SA that produces (x, a)
in a first stage, and upon receiving a random challenge c produces z, such that for any x◦ ∈ X
Pr
c
[
x=x◦ ∧ V (x, a, c, z) : (x, a, z)← 〈S
A, c〉
]
&
1
O(q2)
Pr
H
[
x=x◦ ∧ V (x, a,H(x, a), z) : (x, a, z)← A
H
]
,
where the approximate inequality hides a term that is bounded by 12q|C| when summed over all x◦ ∈ X .
Understanding that x is given to V along with the first message a but also treating it as an output of SA,
while V ’s output v is its decision to accept or not, we write this as
Pr
[
x=x◦ ∧ v = accept : (x, v)← 〈S
A,V〉
]
&
1
O(q2)
Pr
H
[
x=x◦ ∧ V
H
FS(x, pi) : (x, pi) ← A
H
]
.
Summed over all x◦ ∈ X , this in particular implies that
Pr
[
〈SA,V〉 = accept
]
≥
1
O(q2)
Pr
H
[
V HFS(x, pi) : (x, pi)← A
H
]
−
1
2q|C|
.
Remark 7 We point out that the above arguments extend to a FS-adversary A that, besides the instance
x and the proof pi = (a, z), also produces some local (possibly quantum) output satisfying some (quantum)
predicate that may depend on x, a, z. The resulting Σ-adversary SA is then ensured to produce a local
output that satisfies the considered predicate as well, up to the given loss in the probability. Indeed, we can
simply include this local output in z and extend the predicate V accordingly.
In a very broad sense, the above means that for any FS-adversary A there exists a Σ-adversary SA
that “achieves the same thing” up to a O(q2) loss in success probability. Hence, for matching corresponding
security definitions, security of a Σ-protocol (against a dishonest prover) implies security of its Fiat-Shamir
transform.
We summarize here the above basic transformation from an adaptive FS-adversary A to an adaptive
Σ-adversary SA.
Theorem 8 There exists a black-box quantum polynomial-time two-stage quantum algorithm S such that for
any adaptive Fiat-Shamir adversary A, making q queries to a uniformly random function H with appropriate
domain and range, and for any x◦ ∈ X :
Pr
[
x=x◦ ∧ v = accept : (x, v)← 〈S
A,V〉
]
&
1
O(q2)
Pr
H
[
x=x◦ ∧ V
H
FS(x, pi) : (x, pi) ← A
H
]
,
where the & hides a term that is bounded by 12q|C| when summed over all x◦.
Below, we apply the above general reduction to the respective standard definitions for soundness and proof
of knowledge. Each property comes in the variants computational and statistical, for guarantees against
computationally bounded or unbounded adversaries respectively, and one may consider the static or the
adaptive case.
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3.4 Preservation of soundness
Let Σ = (P ,V) be a Σ-protocol for a relation R, and let FS[Σ] be its Fiat-Shamir transformation. We set
L := {x ∈ X | ∃w ∈ W : R(x,w)}. It is understood that P and V , as well as R and thus L, may depend on a
security parameter η. We note that in the following definition, we overload notation a bit by writing A for
both for the ordinary static and for the adaptive adversary (even though a given A is usually either static
or adaptive).
Definition 9 Σ is (computationally/statistically) sound if there exists a negligible function µ(η) such
that for any (quantum polynomial-time/unbounded) adversary A and any η ∈ N:
Pr [〈A,V(x)〉 = accept] ≤ µ(η)
for all x /∈ L; respectively, in case of an adaptive A:
Pr [x 6∈ L ∧ v = accept : (x, v)← 〈A,V〉] ≤ µ(η) .
FS[Σ] is (computationally/statistically) sound if there exists a negligible function µ(η) and a constant
e such that for any (quantum polynomial-time/unbounded) adversary A and any η ∈ N:
Pr
H
[
V HFS(x, pi) : pi ← A
H
]
≤ qeµ(η)
for all x /∈ L; respectively, in case of an adaptive A:
Pr
H
[
V HFS(x, pi) ∧ x /∈ L : (x, pi)← A
H
]
≤ qeµ(η) .
Remark 10 Note that for the soundness of FS[Σ], the adversary A’s success probability may unavoidably
grow with the number q of oracle queries, but we require that it grows only polynomially in q.
Remark 11 In line with Section 2, the description of a quantum algorithm A is understood to include the
initial state |φ0〉. As such, when quantifying over all A it is understood that this includes a quantification
over all |φ0〉 as well. This stays true when considering A to be quantum polynomial-time, which means that
the unitaries Ai can be computed by polynomial-time quantum circuits, and q is polynomial in size, but
does not put any restriction on |φ0〉.
13 This is in line with [Unr12, Def. 1], which explicitly spells out this
quantification.
We consider the following to be folklore knowledge; for completeness, we still give a proof in Appendix A.
Lemma 12 If Σ is computationally/statistically sound for static adversaries then it is also computation-
ally/statistically sound for adaptive adversaries.
The following is now an immediate application of Theorem 8 and the above observation regarding static and
adaptive security for Σ-protocols.
Corollary 13 Let Σ be a Σ-protocol with superpolynomially sized challenge space C. If Σ is computation-
ally/statistically sound against a static adversary then FS[Σ] is computationally/statistically sound against
an adaptive adversary.
13 In other words, A is then non-uniform quantum polynomial-time with quantum advice.
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Proof. Applying Theorem 8, we find that for any adaptive FS-adversary A, polynomially bounded in the
computational setting, there exists an adaptive Σ-protocol adversary SA, polynomially bounded if A is, so
that
Pr
[
x /∈ L ∧ V HFS(x, pi) : (x, pi) ← A
H
]
=
∑
x◦ /∈L
Pr
[
x=x◦ ∧ V
H
FS(x, pi) : (x, pi) ← A
H
]
≤ O(q2) ·
(( ∑
x◦ /∈L
Pr
[
x=x◦ ∧ v = accept : (x, v)← 〈S
A,V〉
])
+
1
2q|C|
)
= O(q2) ·
(
Pr
[
x 6∈ L ∧ v = accept : (x, v)← 〈SA,V〉
])
+
O(q)
|C|
≤ O(q2) · µ(η) +
O(q)
|C|
where the last inequality holds for some negligible function µ(η) if Σ is sound against an adaptive adversary.
The latter is ensured by the assumed soundness against a static adversary and Lemma 12. This bound
can obviously be written as q2µ′(η) for another negligible function µ′(η), showing the claimed soundness of
FS[Σ]. ⊓⊔
3.5 Preservation as a proof of knowledge
We now recall the definition of a proof of knowledge, sometimes also referred to as (witness) extractability,
tailored to the case of a negligible “knowledge error”. Informally, the requirement is that if A succeeds in
proving an instance x, then by using A as a black-box only it is possible to extract a witness for x. In case
of an arbitrary but fixed x, this property is formalized in a rather straightforward way; however, in case of
an adaptive A, the formalization is somewhat subtle, because one can then not refer to the x for which A
manages to produce a proof. We adopt the approach (though not the precise formalization) from [Unr17],
which requires x to satisfy an arbitrary but fixed predicate.
Definition 14 Σ is a (computational/statistical) proof of knowledge if there exists a quantum
polynomial-time black-box ‘knowledge extractor’ K, a polynomial p(η), a constant d ≥ 0, and a negligible
function κ(η) such that for any (quantum polynomial-time/unbounded) adversary A, any η ∈ N and any
x ∈ X :
Pr
[
(x,w) ∈ R : w ← KA(x)
]
≥
1
p(η)
· Pr [〈A,V(x)〉 = accept]d − κ(η) ;
respectively, in case of an adaptive A:
Pr
[
x ∈ X ∧ (x,w) ∈ R : (x,w) ← KA
]
≥
1
p(η)
· Pr [x ∈ X ∧ v = accept : (x, v)← 〈A,V〉]
d
− κ(η)
for any subset X ⊆ X .
FS[Σ] is a (computational/statistical) proof of knowledge if there exists a polynomial-time black-
box ‘knowledge extractor’ E, a polynomial p(η), constants d, e ≥ 0, and a negligible function µ(η), such that
for any (quantum polynomial-time/unbounded) algorithm A, any η ∈ N and any x ∈ X :
Pr
[
(x,w) ∈ R : w ← EA(x)
]
≥
1
qep(η)
· Pr
H
[
V HFS(x, pi) : pi ← A
H
]d
− µ(η). ;
respectively, in case of an adaptive A:
Pr
[
x ∈ X ∧ (x,w) ∈ R : (x,w) ← EA
]
≥
1
qep(η)
· Pr
H
[
x ∈ X ∧ V HFS(x, pi) : (x, pi)← A
H
]d
− µ(η)
for any subset X ⊆ X , where q is the number of queries A makes.
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Also here, for Σ-protocols static security implies adaptive security.
Lemma 15 If Σ is a computational/statistical proof of knowledge for static A then it is also a computa-
tional/statistical proof of knowledge for adaptive A.
Again, the following is now an immediate application of Theorem 8 and the above observation regarding
static and adaptive security for Σ-protocols.
Corollary 16 Let Σ be a Σ-protocol with superpolynomially sized C. If Σ is a computational/statistical proof
of knowledge for static adversaries then FS[Σ] is a computational/statistical proof of knowledge for adaptive
adversaries.
Proof. First, we observe that by Lemma 15, we may assume Σ to be a computational/statistical proof of
knowledge for adaptive adversaries. Let K be the black-box knowledge extractor. Let A be an (quantum
polynomial-time/unbounded) adaptive FS-adversary A. We define a black-box knowledge extractor E for
FS[Σ] as follows. EA simply works by running KS
A
, where SA the adaptive Σ-protocol adversary obtained
by invoking Theorem 8. For any subset X ⊆ X , invoking the proof-of-knowledge property of Σ and using
Theorem 8, we see that
Pr
[
x ∈ X ∧ (x,w) ∈ R : (x,w) ← EA
]
= Pr
[
x ∈ X ∧ (x,w) ∈ R : (x,w)← KS
A]
=
1
p(η)
· Pr
[
x ∈ X ∧ v = accept(x, v)← 〈SA,V〉
]d
− κ(η)
=
1
p(η)
·
( ∑
x◦∈X
Pr
[
x = x◦ ∧ v = accept(x, v)← 〈S
A,V〉
])d
− κ(η)
≥
1
p(η)
(
1
O(q2)
∑
x◦∈X
Pr
H
[
x = x◦ ∧ V
H
FS(x, pi) : (x, pi)← A
H
]
−
1
2q|C|
)d
− κ(η)
≥
1
p(η) ·O(q2d)
· Pr
H
[
x ∈ X ∧ V HFS(x, pi) : (x, pi)← A
H
]d
− µ(η)
for some negligible function µ(η). ⊓⊔
Remark 17 We point out that in [Unr17] Unruh considers a stronger notion of extractability than our
Definition 14, where it is required that, in some sense, the extractor also recovers any local (possibly quantum)
output of the adversary A. In the light of Remark 7, we expect that our result also applies to this stronger
notion of extractability.
4 Application to Fiat-Shamir signatures
Any Fiat-Shamir non-interactive proof system can easily be transformed into a public-key signature scheme.14
The signer simply proves knowledge of a witness (the secret key) for a composite statement x∗ := x‖m, which
includes the public key x as well as the message m. The signature σ then consists of a proof for x∗.
Definition 18 A binary relation R with instance generator G is said to be hard if for any quantum
polynomial-time algorithm A we have
Pr [(x,w′) ∈ R : (x,w)← G,w′ ← A(x)] ≤ µ(η)
for some negligible function µ(η), where G is such that it always outputs a pair (x,w) ∈ R.
14 In fact, that is how the Fiat-Shamir transform was originally conceived in [FS87]. Only later [BG93] adapted the
idea to construct a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof system.
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Definition 19 A Fiat-Shamir signature scheme based on a Σ-protocol Σ = (P ,V) for a hard relation R with
instance generator G, denoted by Sig[Σ] is defined by the triple (Gen, Sign, Verify), with
– Gen: Pick (x,w) ← G, set sk := (x,w) and pk := x.
– SignH(sk,m): Return (m,σ) where σ ← PHFS(x‖m,w).
– VerifyH(pk,m, σ): Return V HFS(x‖m,σ).
Here (PHFS , V
H
FS) = FS[Σ
∗], where Σ∗ = (P∗,V∗) is the Σ-protocol obtained from Σ by setting P∗(x‖m) =
P(x) and V∗(x‖m) = V(x) for any m.
Note that by definition of FS in Section 3.2, we use V HFS(x‖m,σ) as shortcut for V (x‖m, a,H(x‖m, a), z).
We investigate the following standard security notions for signature schemes.
Definition 20 (sEUF−CMA/EUF−NMA) A signature scheme fulfills strong existential unforgeability un-
der chosen-message attack (sEUF−CMA) if for all quantum polynomial-time algorithms A and for uniformly
random H : X ′ → C it holds that
Pr
[
VerifyH(pk,m, σ) ∧ (m,σ) /∈ Sig−q : (pk, sk)← Gen, (m,σ)← AH,Sig(pk)
]
is negligible. Here Sig is classical oracle which upon classical input m returns SignH(m, sk), and Sig−q is
the list of all queries made to Sig.
Analogously, a signature scheme fulfills existential unforgeability under no-message attack (EUF−NMA)
if for all quantum polynomial-time algorithms A and for uniformly random H : X ′ → C it holds that
Pr
[
VerifyH(pk,m, σ) : (pk, sk)← Gen, (m,σ)← AH(pk)
]
is negligible.
The unforgeability (against no-message attacks) of a Fiat-Shamir signature scheme is shown below to
follow from the proof-of-knowledge property of the underlying proof system (hence, as we now know, of the
underlying Σ-protocol), under the assumption that the relation is hard, i.e. it is infeasible to compute sk
from pk.
Theorem 21 Let Σ be Σ-protocol for some hard relation R, with superpolynomially sized challenge space
C and the proof-of-knowledge property according to Definition 14. Then, the Fiat-Shamir signature scheme
Sig[Σ] fulfills EUF−NMA security.
Proof. Let A be an adversary against EUF−NMA, issuing at most q quantum queries to H . We show that
AdvEUF−NMA
Sig[Σ] (A) := Pr
[
VerifyH(pk,m, σ) : (pk, sk)← Gen, (m,σ)← AH(pk)
]
is negligible.
Recall from Definition 19 of Fiat-Shamir signatures that the Σ-protocol Σ∗ is the Σ-protocol Σ where
the prover and verifier ignore the message part m of the instance x‖m. A successful forgery (m,σ) is such
that V HFS(x‖m,σ) accepts the proof σ. Therefore,
AdvEUF−NMA
Sig[Σ] (A) = E
(x,w)←G
[
Pr
H
[
V HFS(x‖m,σ) : (m,σ)← A
H(x)
]]
. (5)
Note that if Σ is a proof of knowledge, so is Σ∗. Our Corollary 16 assures that if Σ∗ is a proof of knowledge,
then also FS[Σ∗] is a proof of knowledge.
For fixed instance x, let X be the set of instance/message strings x′‖m where x′ = x. We apply the
knowledge extractor from Definition 14 to the adaptive FS-attackerAH(x) that has x hard-wired and outputs
14
it along with a message m and the proof/signature σ: There exists a knowledge extractor E , constants d, e
and a polynomial p (all independent of x) such that
Pr
H
[
x′‖m ∈ X ∧ V HFS(x
′‖m,σ) : (x′‖m,σ)← AH(x)
]
≤
(
Pr
[
x′‖m ∈ X ∧ (x′, w) ∈ R : (x′‖m,w)← EA
]
qep(η) + µ(η)
)1/d (6)
Finally, taking the expected value of (6) over the choice of the instance x according to the hard-instance
generator G, we obtain that the left hand side equals AdvEUF−NMA
Sig[Σ] (A). For the right-hand side, we can use
the concavity of (·)1/d (note that we can assume without loss of generality that d > 1) and apply Jensen’s
inequality to obtain
E
x←G
[(
Pr
[
x′‖m ∈ X ∧ (x′, w) ∈ R : (x′‖m,w)← EA
]
qep(η) + µ(η)
)1/d]
≤
(
E
x←G
Pr
[
x′‖m ∈ X ∧ (x′, w) ∈ R : (x′‖m,w)← EA
]
qep(η) + µ(η)
)1/d
.
Note that the expected probability is the success probability of the extractor to produce a witness w matching
the instance x. As long as the relation R is hard according to Definition 18, this success probability is
negligible, proving our claim.
⊓⊔
If we wish for unforgeability under chosen-message attack, zero-knowledge is required as well. [Unr17] and
[KLS18] contain partial results that formalize this intuition, but they were unable to derive the extractability
of the non-interactive proof system. Instead, they modify the Σ-protocol to have a lossy mode [AFLT12], i.e.
a special key-generation procedure that produces key pairs whose public keys are computationally indistin-
guishable from the real ones, but under which it is impossible for any (even unbounded) quantum adversary
to answer correctly.
Our new result above completes these previous analyses, so that we can now state precise conditions
under which a Σ-protocol gives rise to a (strongly) unforgeable Fiat-Shamir signature scheme, without the
need for lossy keys.
Theorem 22 Let Σ be Σ-protocol for some hard relation R, with superpolynomially sized challenge space C
and the proof-of-knowledge property according to Definition 14. Assume further that Σ is ε-perfect (non-abort)
honest-verifier zero-knowledge (naHVZK), has α bits of min entropy and computationally unique responses
as defined in [KLS18]. Then, Sig[Σ] fulfills sEUF−CMA security.
Proof. By Theorem 3.3 of [KLS18], we can use the naHVZK, min-entropy and computationally-unique-
response properties of Σ to reduce an sEUF−CMA adversary to an EUF−NMA adversary15. The conclusion
then follows immediately from our Theorem 21 above. ⊓⊔
5 Extractable Σ-protocols from quantum computationally unique responses
In the last section, we have seen that the proof-of-knowledge property of the underlying Σ-protocol is crucial
for a Fiat-Shamir signature scheme to be unforgeable. In [Unr12], Unruh proved that special soundness (a
witness can be constructed efficiently from two different accepting transcripts) and perfect unique responses
are sufficient conditions for a Σ-protocol to achieve this property in the context of quantum adversaries. The
perfect-unique-responses property is used to show that the final measurement of the Σ-protocol adversary
that produces the response is nondestructive conditioned on acceptance. This property ensures that the
extractor can measure the response, and then rewind “as if nothing had happened”.
15 See also Theorem 25 in [Unr17] for a different proof technique.
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A natural question is therefore which other property except the arguably quite strict condition of perfect
unique responses is sufficient to imply extractability together with special soundness. In [ARU14], the authors
show that computationally unique responses is insufficient to replace perfect unique responses. A Σ-protocol
has computationally unique responses if the verification relation V is collision-resistant from responses to
commitment-challenge pairs in the sense that it is computationally hard to find two valid responses for the
same commitment-challenge pair.
In [Unr16], Unruh introduced the notion of collapsingness, a quantum generalization of the collision-
resistance property for hash functions. It is straight-forward to generalize this notion to apply to binary
relations instead of just functions.
Definition 23 (generalized from [Unr16]) Let R : X × Y → {0, 1} be a relation with |X | and |Y | su-
perpolynomial in the security parameter η, and define the following two games for polynomial-time two-stage
adversaries A = (A1,A2),
Game 1 : (S,X, Y )← A1, r← R(X,Y ), X ←M(X), Y ←M(Y ), b← A2(S,X, Y )
Game 2 : (S,X, Y )← A1, r← R(X,Y ), Y ←M(Y ), b← A2(S,X, Y ).
Here, X and Y are registers of dimension |X | and |Y |, respectively, M denotes a measurement in the
computational basis, and applying R to quantum registers is done by computing the relation coherently and
measuring it. R is called collapsing from X to Y, if an adversary cannot distinguish the two experiments if
the relation holds, i.e. if for all adversaries A it holds that
∣∣∣∣ PrA, Game 1 [r = b = 1]− PrA, Game 2 [r = b = 1]
∣∣∣∣ ≤ negl(η). (7)
Note that this definition is equivalent to Definition 23 in [Unr16] for functions, i.e. if R(x, y) = 1 if and only
if f(x) = y for some function f .
Via the relation that is computed by the second stage of the verifier, the collapsingness property can be
naturally defined for Σ-protocols.
Definition 24 (Quantum computationally unique responses) A Σ-protocol has quantum computa-
tionally unique responses, if the verification predicate V (x, ·, ·, ·) : Y × C × Z → {0, 1} seen as a relation
between Y × C and Z is collapsing from Z to Y × C, where Y, C and Z are the commitment, challenge and
response spaces of the protocol, respectively.
Intuitively, for fixed commitment-challenge pairs, no adversary should be able to determine whether a su-
perposition over successful responses z has been measured or not. As in the case of hash functions (where
collapsingness is a natural stronger quantum requirement than collision-resistance), quantum computation-
ally unique responses is a natural stronger quantum requirement than computationally unique responses.
The following is a generalization of Theorem 9 in [Unr12] where the assumption of perfect unique re-
sponses is replaced by the above quantum computational version. Additionally, we relax the special soundness
requirement to t-soundness, which requires that for any first message a, for uniformly random chosen chal-
lenges c1, . . . , ct, and for any responses z1, . . . , zt with V (x, ai, ci, zi) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , t}, a witness w for x
can be efficiently computed except with negligible probability (over the choices of the ci).
Theorem 25 (Generalization of Theorem 9 from [Unr12]) Let Π be a Σ-protocol with t-soundness
for some constant t and with quantum computationally unique responses. Then Π is a computational proof
of knowledge as in Definition 14.
The proof follows very much the proof of Theorem 9 in [Unr12], up to some small extensions; thus, we only
give a proof sketch here.
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Proof (sketch). We consider the following extractor K. It runs A to the point where it outputs a. Then, it
chooses a random challenge c1 and sends it to A, and obtains a response z1 by measuring A’s corresponding
register. K then rewinds A (on the measured state!) and chooses and sends to A a fresh random challenge
c2, resulting in a response z2, etc., up to obtaining response zt. If V (x, ai, ci, zi) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , t} then K
can compute w except with negligible probability by the t-soundness property; otherwise, it aborts.
It remains to analyze the probability, denoted by F below, that V (x, ai, ci, zi) for all i. If the Σ-protocol
has perfect unique responses then measuring the response z is equivalent to measuring whether the response
satisfies the verification predicate V (with respect to x, a, c). Lemma 29 in Appendix B, which generalizes
Lemma 7 in [Unr12], allows us then to control the probability F by means of the probability V thatA succeeds
in convincing the verifier in an ordinary run (this holds for an arbitrary but fixed a, and on average over a
by means of Jensen’s inequality). If the Σ-protocol has quantum computationally unique responses instead,
then measuring the response z is computationally indistinguishable from measuring whether the response
satisfies the verification predicate, and so there can only be a negligible loss in the success probability of K
compared to above. ⊓⊔
We expect the above theorem to be very useful in practice, for the following reason. Usually, Σ-protocols
deployed in Fiat-Shamir signature schemes have computationally unique responses to ensure strong unforge-
ability via Theorem 22 or similar reductions. On the other hand, only very artificial separations between
the notions of collision resistance and collapsingness for hash functions are known (e.g. the one presented
in [Zha17]). It is therefore plausible that many Σ-protocols deployed in strongly unforgeable Fiat-Shamir
signature schemes have quantum computationally unique responses as well. In the next section we take a look
at a couple of examples that form the basis of some signature schemes submitted to the NIST competition
for the standardization of post-quantum cryptographic schemes.
6 Application to NIST submissions
In the previous sections we gave sufficient conditions for a Fiat-Shamir signature scheme to be existentially
unforgeable in the QROM. Several schemes of the Fiat-Shamir kind have made it into the second round of
the NIST post-quantum standardization process. In this section we outline how our result might be applied
to some of these schemes, and under which additional assumptions. We leave the problems of applying our
techniques to the actual (highly optimized) signature schemes and of working out the concrete security
bounds for future work.
6.1 Picnic
In order to obtain QROM-security, Picnic uses the Unruh transform [Unr15] instead of the Fiat-Shamir
transformation, incurring a 1.6x loss in efficiency (according to [CDG+17]) compared to Fish, which is the
same scheme under plain Fiat-Shamir.
The underlying sigma-protocol for these schemes is ZKB++ [CDG+17], an optimized version of ZKBoo
[GMO16], which uses an arbitrary one-way function φ, a commitment scheme COM and a multi-party
computation protocol to prove knowledge of a secret key. Roughly, a prover runs the multi-party protocol ‘in
its head’ (i.e. simulates the three agents from the protocol, see [IKOS07]) to compute pk := φ(sk). Only a
prover who knows the secret key can produce the correct view of all three agents, but the public key suffices
to verify the correctness of two of the views. In the first round, the prover uses COM to commit to all three
views separately, and sends these commitments to the verifier. The verifier replies with a random challenge
i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, to which the prover in turn responds by opening the i-th and i+1-th commitment.
ZKBoo does not specify a concrete commitment scheme for COM. A natural option is to commit by
hashing the input together with some random bits.
Corollary 26 Sig[ZKBoo] is strongly existentially unforgeable in the QROM when COM is instantiated with
a hash function H.
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Proof. If we treat H as a quantum-accessible random oracle, then H is collapsing by [Unr16]. Since the
response of the prover in the third round consists only of openings to the commitments ci, ci+1, i.e. preim-
ages of ci and ci+1 under H , and since collapsingness is closed under concurrent composition [Feh18], the
collapsingness of H implies that ZKBoo has quantum computational unique responses. ZKBoo further has
3-soundness, and thus the claim follows using Theorems 25 and 22. ⊓⊔
ZKB++ improves on ZKBoo by introducing optimizations specific to the signature context, which com-
plicate the analysis of the overall scheme. We therefore leave the adaption of Corollary 26 to ZKB++ and
Fish for future work.
6.2 Lattice-based Fiat-Shamir signature schemes – CRYSTALS-Dilithium and qTesla
In [Lyu09] and [Lyu12], Lyubashevsky developed a Fiat-Shamir signature scheme based on (ring) lattice
assumptions. In the following, we explain the lattice case and mention ring-based lattice terms in parentheses.
The underlying sigma protocol, which forms the basis of the NIST submissions CRYSTALS-Dilithium and
qTesla, can be roughly described as follows. The instance is given by a key pair ((A, T ), S), with T = AS. Here,
A and S are matrices of appropriate dimensions over a finite field (polynomials of appropriate degree), and
S is small. For the first message to the verifier, the prover selects a random short vector (small polynomial)
y, and sends over Ay. The second message, from the verifier to the prover, is a random vector (polynomial)
c with entries (coefficients) in {−1, 0, 1} and a small Hamming weight. The third message, i.e. the response
of the prover, is z = Sc+y, which is short (small) as well. The prover actually sends z only with a particular
probability, which is chosen so as to make the distribution of (sent) z independent of S. Otherwise, it aborts
and tries again. Verification is done by checking whether z is indeed short (small), and whether Az−Ay = Tc.
Let us denote this protocol by LatticeΣ. In the following we restrict our attention to the lattice case, but we
expect that one can do a similar analysis for the ring-based schemes.
The security of the scheme is, in the lattice case, based on the Short Integer Solution (SIS) problem,
which essentially guarantees that it is hard to find an integral solution to a linear system that has a small
norm. The computationally unique responses property for the simple Σ-protocol described above, in fact,
follows directly from SIS: If one can find a vector c and two short vectors xi, i = 1, 2 such that Ax0 = c = Ax1,
then the difference x = x1 − x0 is a short solution to the linear system Ax = 0.
Another way to formulate the computationally unique responses property for the above Σ-protocol is as
follows. Let S ⊂ Fnq be the set of short vectors. Let fA : S → F
m
q be the restriction to S of the linear map
given by the matrix A ∈ Fm×nq . The Σ-protocol above has computationally unique responses if and only
if fA is collision resistant. As pointed out at the end of Section 5, the known examples that separate the
collision resistance and collapsingness properties are fairly artificial. Hence it is a natural to assume that fA
is collapsing as well.
Assumption 27 For m,n and q polynomial in the security parameter η, the function family fA keyed by a
uniformly random matrix A ∈ Fm×nq is collapsing.
Under Assumption 27, LatticeΣ has quantum computational unique responses, and hence gives rise to an
unforgeable Fiat-Shamir signature scheme.
Corollary 28 Under Assumption 27, Sig[LatticeΣ] is strongly existentially unforgeable in the QROM.
As mentioned at the end of the introduction, in their concurrent and independent work [LZ19], Lie and
Zhandry show that fA satisfies their notion of weak -collapsingness (assuming hardness of LWE), which
roughly says that there is some non-negligible probability that the adversary does not notice a measurement.
Weak-collapsingness implies a similarly weakened variant of our property ‘quantum computational responses’,
which is still sufficient to let the proof of Theorem 25 go through, albeit with a worse but still non-negligible
success probability for the knowledge-extractor.
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A Proof of Lemma 12 and 15
Proof (of Lemma 12). Let A be an adaptive Σ-protocol adversary, producing x and a in the first stage, and z
in the second stage. We then consider the following algorithms. Ainit runs the first stage of A (using the same
initial state), outputting x and a. Let |ψx,a〉 be the corresponding internal state at this point. Furthermore,
for any possible x and a, Ax,a is the following static Σ-protocol adversary. Its initial state is |ψx,a〉|a〉 and in
the first stage it simply outputs a, and in the second stage, after having received the verifier’s challenge, it
runs the second stage of A. We then see that
Pr
[
x 6∈ L ∧ v = accept : (x, v)← 〈A,V〉
]
=
∑
x◦ 6∈L
Pr
[
x = x◦ ∧ v = accept : (x, v)← 〈A,V〉
]
=
∑
x◦ 6∈L
∑
a
Pr
[
Ainit = (x◦, a)
]
Pr
[
〈Ax◦,a,V(x◦)〉 = accept
]
.
Since Pr
[
〈Ax◦,a,V(x◦)〉 = accept
]
is bounded by a negligible function, given that Ax,a is a (quantum
polynomial-time/unbounded) static adversary, the claim follows. ⊓⊔
20
Proof (of Lemma 15). Let A be an adaptive Σ-protocol adversary, producing x and a in the first stage, and
z in the second stage. We construct a black-box knowledge extractor Kad that works for any such A. In a
first step, KAad runs the first stage of A using the black-box access to A (and having access to the initial
state of A). Below, we call this first stage of A as Ainit. This produces x and a, and we write |ψx,a〉 for the
corresponding internal state. Then, it runs KA
x,a
na , where Kna is the knowledge extractor guaranteed to exist
for static adversaries, and Ax,a is the static adversary that works as follows. It’s initial state is |ψx,a〉|a〉 and
in the first stage it simply outputs a, and in the second stage it runs the second stage of A on the state |ψx,a〉.
Note that having obtained x and a and the state |ψx,a〉 as first step of K
A
ad, K
Ax,a
na can then be executed with
black box access to (the second stage of) A. For any subset X ⊆ X , we now see that
Pr
[
x ∈ X ∧ (x,w) ∈ R : (x,w) ← KAad
]
=
∑
x∈X
∑
a
Pr
[
Ainit = (x, a)
]
Pr
[
(x,w) ∈ R : w ← KA
x,a
na
]
≥
∑
x∈X
∑
a
Pr
[
Ainit = (x, a)
]
·
1
p(η)
· Pr
[
〈Ax,a,V(x)〉 = accept
]d
− κ(η)
≥
1
p(η)
(∑
x∈X
∑
a
Pr
[
Ainit = (x, a)
]
Pr
[
〈Ax,a,V(x)〉 = accept
])d
− κ(η)
=
1
p(η)
Pr
[
x ∈ X ∧ v=1 : (x, v) ← 〈Ax,a,V(x)〉
]d
− κ(η) ,
where the first inequality is because of the static proof-of-knowledge property, and the second is Jensen’s
inequality, noting that we may assume without loss of generality that d ≥ 1. ⊓⊔
B Generalization of Lemma 7 from [Unr12]
Lemma 29 Let P1, . . . , Pn be projections and |ψ〉 a state vector, and set
V :=
1
n
∑
i
〈ψ|Pi|ψ〉 =
1
n
∑
i
‖Pi|ψ〉‖
2 and F :=
1
nt
∑
i1···it
‖Pit · · ·Pi1 |ψ〉‖
2 .
Then F ≥ V 2t−1.
The case t = 2 was proven in [Unr12, Lemma 7]. We show here how to extend the proof to t = 3; the general
case works along the same lines.
Proof (of the case t = 3). For convenience, set A := 1n
∑
i Pi and |ψijk〉 := PkPjPi|ψ〉. Then, using convexity
of the function x 7→ x5 to argue the first inequality, we get
V 5 = (〈ψ|A|ψ〉)5 = 〈ψ|A5|ψ〉 =
1
n5
∑
ijkℓm
〈ψ|PiPjPkPℓPm|ψ〉 =
1
n5
∑
ijkℓm
〈ψijk |ψmℓk〉
=
1
n
∑
k
(
1
n2
∑
ij
〈ψijk |
)(
1
n2
∑
ℓm
|ψmℓk〉
)
=
1
n
∑
k
∥∥∥ 1
n2
∑
ij
|ψijk〉
∥∥∥2 ≤ 1
n3
∑
ijk
‖|ψijk〉‖
2 = F ,
where the last inequality is Claim 2 in the proof of Lemma 7 in [Unr12]. ⊓⊔
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